Time and Meaning: A Cultural Semiotics of Temporal and Aspectual Ideologies by Leone, Massimo
Lexia. Rivista di semiotica, 27–28
Aspettualità
ISBN 978-88-255-0876-5
DOI 10.4399/97888255087652
pag. 17–63 (giugno 2017)
Time and Meaning
A Cultural Semiotics of Temporal and Aspectual Ideologies
M L*
 : Tempo e senso. Semiotica della cultura e ideologie aspet-
tuali e temporali
: Cultures can be categorized depending on whether they concen-
trate their attention on the past, the present, or the future, and depending
on whether this attention is euphoric, dysphoric, or neutral. The present
essay intends to complexify such articulation through suggesting that it
might include also aspectuality and be traversed by the three semiotic
dimensions of indexical reference to the ontology of time, iconic repre-
sentation of it, and symbolical evocation of it. In other words, cultures
do not diverge only in terms of ’when’ in time they focus their attention
on, but also in terms of ’how’ in time they do so.
: Temporality; Aspectuality; Cultural Semiotics; Ideologies of
Time.
Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio;
si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio
A  H, Confessions, XI, 
. Indexes, symbols, and icons of time
Whereas time is ontological, temporality is semiotic. Visitors to the
Grand Canyon are told that each layer of the multicolored stratification
∗ University of Turin.
. One could argue that the whole history of western philosophy is about time;
seeking to provide a bibliography about it is, therefore, meaningless. Among the semiotic
texts that most focus on the difference between time and temporality, see, in particular,
those written by Algirdas J. Greimas and Paul Ricoeur in their intense dialogue about

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of rocks took shape a certain number of years ago. Although the
segmentation of time into years is a partially semiotic matter (singling
out an astronomical phenomenon among others), the dating of the
layers is a question of precision, not one of interpretation. The same
visitors, however, are instructed to recognize, within the majestic
amphitheater of minerals, “the Temple of Shiva”, or “the Pyramid of
Cheops” (Fig. ).
Figure . Pareidolias in the Grand Canyon.
Such enticing exercise of pareidolia (Leone ) invites spectators
to appreciate a dimension of temporality, not one of time. The sump-
tuous mineral formations are not ontologically dated, but semiotically
attributed an aura of time, a narrative temporality. Temporality is
the product of the encounter between ontological time and language.
Sciences measure the time of nature, whilst humanities gauge its
temporality ( Jaroszkiewicz ). It is impossible to directly grasp
this subject: Ricoeur and Greimas ; see also D’Agostino . Among recent titles
of secondary literature in semiotics that concentrate on time, see Pinto ; Fontanille
; Guillemette and Hébert . Most of the ‘classics’ of linguistics and semiotics, then,
implicitly or explicitly deal with the relation between language and time.
. See Buccellati .
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the ontology of time without the filter of language (Biémont ).
Chronometers, clocks, and calendars are, indeed, language (Spagnou
). They are so, however, according to a semiotic dynamic that
Charles S. Peirce would have defined as “indexical”: there is a certain
relation of cause and effect, of physical contiguity, between, on the
one hand, the natural fact that the earth needs a certain ontological
time to revolve around the sun and, on the other hand, the cultural
fact that Gregorian calendars comprise  days on non–leap years,
 on leap years (Holford–Strevens ).
Temporality, on the contrary, is never indexical. It is, rather, iconic:
language seeks to construct semiotic artifacts of various kinds whose
inner structure resemble that of ontological time, without, for that
reason, being in any physical contiguity with it (Weinrich ). In
literary narratives, for instance, readers receive the impression that
fictional events happen in a temporal framework that somehow re-
semble that of the ontological time in which they, the readers, are
immersed (Segre ). When they shudder at the imminent death
of the protagonist, they do so because they grasp an intimate anal-
ogy between the protagonist’s fictional mortality and the ontological
finitude of their own days. It is precisely on the basis of this analogy,
then, that narrative temporality can dramatically diverge from the
ontological instinct of time, as it is the case in all those literary genres
that play with such distortion (science fiction, fantasy, etc.) ( Jones and
Ormrod ).
Both natural elements and cultural artifacts indexically refer to
the ontological line of time. Only cultural artifacts, however (that
is, elements of reality that would not exist without the initiative of
human agency), also iconically refer to it, meaning that they deploy
an array of semiotic means in order to analogically represent such
line (Phillips ). Temporality is the product of this representation.
But the Peircean semiotic trichotomy applies to time too. Natural
elements contain indexes of time only; cultural elements also include
indexes of time, but might function as icons of time too; cultural
elements, however, contain symbols of time as well, that is, semiotic
hints at a temporal dimension that refers to no ontological counter-
part. Symbolical temporality is particularly evident in those cultural
artifacts that do not denote time but connote it. Verbal language, in-
deed, can resort to a morphology (that of verbs, for instance) whose
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structure analogically refers to that of the ontology of time ( Jaszczolt
and de Saussure ). Human beings psychologically experience the
fact that time flows from a past some images of which they store in
their memory, through a fleeting present that they live in in medias res,
to a future some images of which they construct in their expectations,
hopes, and fears (Wearden ). Analogously, many verbal natural
languages allow human beings and groups to iconically refer to the
structure of such psychological apperception of the ontology of time
(Mozersky ).
Nevertheless, many cultural artifacts are not constructed through
systems of signs including such possibility, that is, a morphology that
iconically resembles that of the ontology of time. A courthouse, for
instance, is made of materials that indexically refer to ontological time
(marble that appeared in nature two hundred million years ago, wood
that appeared in nature five decades ago, glass that was fabricated few
years ago, etc.) (McNamara ). A courthouse, however, does not
iconically represent time. It might refer to its aspectuality, as it shall
be seen, but not analogically involve a representation of it. Most archi-
tectural entities, indeed, as well as many other non–verbal cultural
artifacts, uniquely live in the present. That does not mean, though, as
historians and semioticians of architecture know well, that a building
cannot symbolically refer to the ontology of time, connoting, rather
than denoting, a certain temporality and aspectuality. The architect
of a courthouse can, for instance, play with the temporal ontology of
materials, as well as with their cultural connotations, in order to con-
vey a certain symbolical temporality. A courthouse entirely fabricated
in glass and carbon fiber, will symbolically connote a projection of
both the building and the human activities that it hosts — that is, the
administration of law — into the future. A marble courthouse will, on
the contrary, transmit a retrograde idea of time, connoting, through
its own material, a symbolical temporality focused, rather, on the past
of human legal relations (Leone ).
The three semiotic dynamics of ontological time, iconic tempo-
rality, and symbolic temporality differently involve an aspectual di-
mension. Ontological time does not involve any aspectuality, meaning
that it does not entail the semiotic presence of a point of view on
time. Marble, for instance, will always ontologically refer to the Tri-
assic geological era, independently from how it is looked at. Verbal
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iconic representations of time can rely on a systemically structured
morphology in order to represent not only when things take place in
time, but also how they do so. The traditional study field of linguistic
aspectuality precisely focuses on such morphology (Guentchéva ).
Non–verbal artifacts, including non–figurative visual representations,
do not iconically refer to the aspects of ontological time (to the fact,
for instance, that an event takes place in a precise instant of time,
or that it lasts, instead, throughout a stretched present). They can,
however, symbolically refer to it. The architecture of a courthouse,
for example, can not only symbolically evoke a certain temporality
through the choice of its own construction materials and their tempo-
ral connotations; it can, also, connote a specific aspectuality. A wooden
courthouse, for example, such as those where trials would take place
in early US history, symbolically connotes both a temporal dimen-
sion (the recent past of its materials) and an aspectual dimension (the
building, as well as the law, is impermanent, subject to the impetus of
external forces).
In a previous article of mine, I have pointed out that cultures can
be categorized depending on whether they concentrate their attention
on the past, the present, or the future, and depending on whether
this attention is euphoric, dysphoric, or neutral (Leone  Longing).
The present essay intends to complexify such articulation through
suggesting that it might include also aspectuality and be traversed by
the three semiotic dimensions of indexical reference to the ontology
of time, iconic representation of it, and symbolical evocation of it. In
other words, cultures do not diverge only in terms of when in time
they focus their attention on, but also in terms of how in time they do
so.
. Temporal and aspectual cultures
Combining the Peircean semiotic thrichotomy with both the custom-
ary framework for the articulation of time (past, present, future, plus
further nuances that will be expounded upon later) and the complex
array of aspectual marks (denotations and connotations, explicit iconic
morphology or symbolic hints), quite a rich typology of “temporal
cultures” can be obtained, as diagram  shows at a glance.
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Indexical temporality
(ontology of time)
Iconic temporality
(representation of time
through linguistic or
analogous morphology)
Symbolic temporality
(evocation of temporal
phases)
PAST
PRESENT
FUTURE
TEMPORAL ASPECTS Inchoate / during / terminal aspect; etc.
Such typology seeks to account for a theoretical need: in the semi-
otic study of temporal cultures, it is not sufficient, for instance, to
single out cultures that focus on the past, for the particular way in
which they do so is fundamental as well. In other words, that which is
essential is the aspect of such temporal preference.
Aspects of time that are represented through the morphology
of verbal languages are manifold (Guentchéva ); in the present
essay, for the sake of exemplification, only a category of them will be
dealt with, that is, the dialectics among the inchoate aspect of time
(something is seen as beginning to happen), its punctual or durative
or iterative aspect (something is seen as happening at a precise time,
lasting through it, or occurring repetitively through time), and its
terminative aspect (something is seen as ending in time); these three
aspects, then, can apply to the past, the present, and the future, and
receive positive or negative emotional connotations. In the verbal
morphology of English, for instance, one can say that “the mausoleum
was about to be erected” (inchoate past); “the mausoleum was erected”
(punctual past); “the mausoleum was being erected” (durative past);
“the mausoleum was destroyed and erected over and over again”
(iterative past); or “the mausoleum was going to be finally erected”
(terminative past). This variety of verbal and adverbial forms seeks to
iconically render the ontology of temporal aspectuality. Two caveats
are necessary to this regard.
.. Aspectuality and motivation
First, saying that verbal morphologies establish an iconic semiotic
relation with time does not mean that they are per se motivated.
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The variety of linguistic ways of representing the aspects of time,
indeed (through prefixes in languages like Russian or other Slavic
idioms, through explicit verbal morphologies like in English, through
adverbial expressions like in Japanese, etc.) shows that there is no mo-
tivated relation between how events happen in time and the specific
ways in which languages ‘choose’ to represent them through words
( Josephson and Söhrman ). Here, the adjective “iconic” should be
interpreted in Peircean, rather than in Saussurean, terms: a relation
of similarity obtains between the dialectics of aspects in the ontology
of time and that of aspectual forms in language. That means that,
although languages end up representing the aspects of time in a totally
arbitrary way, the internal logic through which this representation
takes place is, on the contrary, motivated.
For example, there is no motivation behind the fact that one should
indicate the iteration in time of an action like “jumping” by means
of either explicit verbal forms, like in the Italian “saltellare” (different
from “saltare”, which is its punctual counterpart), or through adver-
bial forms, like in the English “jump over and over again”; there is,
on the opposite, a precise motivation in the fact that each of these
two languages come up with distinct verbal forms (either suffixes
or adverbs) in order to distinguish between punctual and iterative
jumping, for this distinction is important not only in language but
also in the ontology of time and time perception. In certain circum-
stances, indeed, differentiating between jumping that is beheld only
once and jumping that is beheld over and over again is essential, and
so it is essential also that this discrimination in perception finds its
expression in language. For a sport judge, for example, it may be key
to determine whether, in the ontology of a sport action, someone
“jumped” or “jumped over again”, since one of either actions might
be invalid; similarly, for a novelist it might make a big difference to
say that someone “jumped, rejoicing at the news” or that someone
“jumped over and over again, rejoicing at the news”.
.. Aspectuality and point of view
The second caveat: the iconic relation between the aspectual ontology
of time and the aspectual morphology of language is not the same
as the iconic relation between the ontology of time and the verbal
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(or adverbial) morphology of language, for aspectuality intrinsically
involves the presence of a point of view on time. In other words,
when aspectuality is evoked, it means that time is not considered in its
naked ontology, as flowing of events through the physical dimension
of their evolution; time is, on the opposite, considered as temporal
ontology that is already filtered by the gaze of a (supposedly human)
observer, concentrating its perceptual attention on such or such facet
of temporal ontology. The sentence “the monument was about to
be erected”, for instance, certainly refers to a temporal ontology,
meaning that, in reality, there was no monument up to a certain
time, then the process of its erection started, was carried on, and, at
the moment in which the sentence refers to, such erection is almost
completed; the sentence, however, already implies the presence of an
observer that casts its gaze on such reality, and is also endowed with
sufficient cognition so as to realize and foresee that the completion is
about to take place but has not done so yet.
This example, nevertheless, shows that the difference between, on
the one hand, the iconic relation between temporal ontology and tem-
poral verbal morphology and, on the other hand, the iconic relation
between aspectual ontology and aspectual verbal morphology is not
one of kind but one of degree. In simpler words, there is no direct rela-
tion between language and time. Representing time through language
always evokes the presence of an implicit observer that focuses its
attention on the ontology of time through a certain perspective. The
sentence “the monument was tall”, again, does not constitute a naked
and immediate iconic representation of the ontology of time, since it
chooses to focus on the past rather than on the present or the future.
Such filter, however, is less complex (that is, it implies a cognitive less
complex observer) than the one intrinsically active in the sentence
“the monument was about to be erected”; in the second case, indeed,
the iconic representation of the ontology of time involves a gaze that
not only looks at the past but also does so with the ability to foresee
its evolution toward the less recent past, toward a moment in which a
monument still to be erected is about to become so.
. On this topic, see most contributions in this volume, and especially that by Manetti.
Time and Meaning 
. Non–verbal aspectuality
The two caveats just dealt with are instrumental to introduce a more
central and difficult question, that of determining whether not only
verbal language but also other systems of signs contain elements that
are able to iconically represent not just the phases of the ontology
of time, but its aspects too. This issue is not separated from the task
of articulating a typology of temporal and aspectual cultures but is,
on the contrary, conducive to it. An “aspectual culture” is not simply
one in which, for instance, verbal expressions of the inchoateness
of the past occur but one in which, in addition to that, all sorts of
non–verbal “modeling systems”, as Yuri M. Lotman would call them
(), also focus their implicit reader’s attention on the fact that, first,
the past is more relevant than either the present or the future and,
second, the beginning of the past is more relevant than either its
duration or its end. Nevertheless, in order to ascertain whether such
“aspectual culture” could not only be ‘sensed’ by the researcher, but
also pinpointed with reference to the fact that some specific texts,
instead of others, circulate in the semiosphere, one should be able to
demonstrate that certain aspectual marks are objectively present in
such texts.
That largely depends on the system of signs to which texts refer to.
Movies, for instance, can rely on filmic discursive means in order to
(Wildfeuer and Bateman ): ) represent something that happened
in the past (in relation to the moment in which the movie is made and
shown): that does not necessarily imply resorting to specific filmic
discursive means in order to iconically represent the past (Stewart
); ‘period dramas’, for instance, refer to a historical past through
deploying clothes, hairstyles, vehicles, etc. of that epoch, which they
nevertheless depict as if it was the present, through enunciating it in
the fictional ‘hic et nunc’ of the filmic discourse; ) represent some-
thing that happened in the past of the movie: that, again, does not
necessarily involve specific filmic discursive means: showing a charac-
ter first, then showing the same character impersonated by a younger
actor who closely resembles the one impersonating the first one is
a conventional strategy to represent the past of a movie character
(Thain ), a strategy that, nevertheless, is not specifically filmic,
that is, cannot be compared to, for instance, the verbal morphology
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of the present perfect tense in English; showing the passing of time
through visually representing aging is not the same as iconically rep-
resenting it through an arbitrary semiotic formula; in the example
just mentioned, for example, motivation does not obtain between
the structure of time and that of language but between an aging face
and its fictional representation; in other words, such representation
is motivated, and its arbitrariness rather consists in its being part of a
conventional filmic formula, which nevertheless remains unspecific
of the filmic discourse (there is no difference between realizing that a
friend has aged in reality and realizing that a character has aged in a
movie); ) there are, however, some specific or quasi–specific filmic
discursive means through which a movie makes reference to the past,
be it the historical past of the ontology of time or the discursive past
of the semiotics of the movie.
As regards ), a present–day movie resorting to an obsolete filmic
technique in order to produce its own discourse adopts specific dis-
cursive means so as to evoke the past; the relation of arbitrariness
between the antiquarian filmic feature and the evocation of the past is
not exactly the same as the arbitrariness that obtains, for instance, be-
tween the morphology of the simple past in English and the evocation
of a remote temporal ontology through verbal language; present–day
black and white movies do not evoke the past arbitrarily but because
black and white movies are part of the ontology of the past (on the
contrary, the simple past is exactly the same in the present time as it
was at the time that is represented through its use); resorting to black
and white photography in order to evoke the past in a movie might
be rather compared, in verbal language, to resorting to archaic words
in order to evoke past historical and linguistic eons, like in the classical
expedient of the ‘retrieved manuscript’, by which many historical
novels begin.
As regards ), certain kinds of film transition are sometimes used
to enunciate a past within the discourse of the movie; that might be
the closest thing to an arbitrary and specifically filmic formula that
conveys a past temporal ontology (Hesselberth ).
The issue of determining whether non–verbal systems of signs
(or secondary modeling systems, as Lotman would call them) are
endowed with specific discursive means so as to iconically represent
not only when events happen in time but also how they do so, is even
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more complicated. Cinematically representing the beginning of an
action, indeed, is not tantamount to linguistically focusing on the
beginning of the representation of an action. Iconically rendering the
aspect of an event through simply producing a simulacrum of that
event that focuses on an aspect of it is not the same as relying on a
conventional formula in order to render that aspect. In simpler words:
the Italian verbal discourse adopts the verbal morphology of the
imperfect so as to represent both a bouncing ball that keeps bouncing
through past time (“la palla rimbalzava” [the ball was bouncing], “–
ava” being the desinence of such verbal tense) and whatever other
event that keeps occurring through past time (“l’uomo mangi–ava”,
[the man was eating], etc.).
Nevertheless, when the filmic discourse intends to represent an
event that lasts through past time, it has no other way than represent-
ing that event through a filmic simulacrum that cannot be used to
represent the lasting of another event, exactly because the relation be-
tween signifier and signified is not only motivated but is also indexical:
the simulacrum was created by the fact that the event actually kept
occurring during a certain time in front of the camera. The example
of the filmic discourse, however, might be misleading, since this semi-
otic system can rely on signs that indexically represent the passing of
time. Focusing on semiotic systems that, conversely, cannot rely on
such possibility, might be revealing.
Painting, for instance, cannot indexically represent the fact that
an event keeps occurring through the past. First of all, painting, like
most if not all non–verbal semiotic systems, is bound to represent the
present, and the present only; the past can be evoked only indirectly,
by showing a situation or character twice in different circumstances,
and hinting through various expedients at the fact that one situation
or character constitutes the past of the other; or, alternatively, by
choosing to represent an instant in the logical sequence of instants
that constitute an act or action, and prompting beholders to infer the
past or future of such instant on the basis of their cultural awareness
of the narrative script of that act or action (Calabrese ). Within its
representation of non–present temporality (it should rather be said:
within its representation of a temporality that is not simultaneous to
that of the pictorial enunciation), however, painting can, in addition,
hint at the fact that its simulated temporality is also looked at through
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a particular aspect. Many of Velazquez’s paintings, for example, resort
to the expedient of the blurring representation of an object in order
to signify that that object has been visually grasped and depicted (and
must be mentally imagined) while its transformation through time
was taking place, that is, from the perspective of a durative aspectuality
(Fig. ).
Figure . Diego Velázquez. Circa . Las Hilanderas (“The Spinners”). Oil on
canvas.  cm x  cm. Madrid, Prado Museum.
Such visual expedient is now conventional but its genesis was prob-
ably indexically motivated: when objects keep moving fast in front of
our eyes, we cannot perceive them distinctively (from a certain point
of view, a similar indexical origin might be behind the visual conven-
tion of using certain transitions so as to represent a past temporality
within the filmic discourse: the visual memories that we retrieve are
not usually sharp).
To conclude this preliminary esthetic inquiry into the aspectual
discourse of non–verbal systems of signs: whereas verbal language
adopts arbitrary semiotic means in order to iconically render both
the dialectics among the ontological phases of time and that among
the aspects of such phases, non–verbal systems of signs rely on few of
such arbitrary means and rather resort to a simulation of the aspec-
tuality characterizing the represented action or act itself. The verbal,
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adverbial, or semantic rendering of aspectuality in verbal language
is, therefore, much more powerful and versatile. Furthermore, the
fact that texts produced through non–verbal systems of signs share
few common conventional aspectual marks makes the work of the
cultural semiotician more complicated: how is it possible to detect an
aspectual isotopy throughout a given semiosphere, if aspectuality is
signified through it only by means of either verbal artifacts or local
systems of signs?
. Towards a cultural semiotics of temporal and aspectual ideolo-
gies
The fact that aspectuality works in radically different ways depending
on the semiotic system that is adopted to signify it might not, how-
ever, be entirely central. That which constitutes the main goal of the
cultural semiotician, indeed, is not to ascertain whether a certain form
of temporality or aspectuality statistically occurs more frequently in
a given semiosphere. Ascertaining that, for instance, the present–day
world literature uses less the future tense than the world literature of
the s might be relevant but only as a symptom of the fact that the
former semiosphere ideologically attributes less value to the future
than the latter (Bode ). In other words, that which matters is not
the statistic relevance of a certain temporality or aspect of time, but
the observation that they become the cornerstone of a narrative. In
other terms, that which matters is not how often a society talks about
the past, or about the beginning of the past, but rather how often a
society situates the key stages of its narratives in such temporal phase
or aspectual dimension.
It is now time to seek to fill up the empty typology schematized
above, taking into account the semiotic caveats subsequently for-
mulated, but minding, above all, the way in which such typology is
pervaded with narrative values.
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. Ideologies of the past
A semiosphere can concentrate on the past. That implies that, first,
many if not most texts circulating through such semiosphere adopt a
verbal or non–verbal morphology in order to refer to previous histori-
cal periods. In a demographically stagnant society like the present–day
Italian one, for instance, it is common to come across conversations
where most statements revolve around the rekindling of a remote
past, which is then contrasted to the present so as to devaluate the
latter in relation to the former. This kind of comparison is not new;
it recurrently dominates the social discourse especially in the phases
of sociocultural crisis and renewal; the French “querelle des anciens
et des modernes”, which flourished from the th century on (Lecoq
), is another example of such ‘present time bashing’ through the
uncritical extolling of the past. Also non–verbal texts and representa-
tions can contribute to a semiosphere’s focusing on the past, albeit
with the semiotic restrictions that have been described above. In late
th–century France, for instance, the flourishing of the Neoclassical
school of historical painting, represented by artists such as Jacques–
Louis David and Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres, can be considered
as the pictorial outcome of a cultural context that was shocked by the
revolution (a sociopolitical event that usually wipes the past away and
dramatically institutes a new radically different present) and nervously
sought to come to terms with its past, through both historical visual
representations and their metaphoric power (Bordes ; Porterfield
and Siegfried ).
A semiosphere’s concentration on the past, however, does not usu-
ally limit itself to verbally or non–verbally referring to it but tends to
embed it in narratives where the past itself becomes an object of value.
That can occur with different aspectualities. Certain cultures especially
valorize the inchoate aspect of a past historical period. Such is the case,
for instance, of all societies that are obsessed with commemorating
their historical or, rather, mythical foundations (Watthee–Delmotte
and O’Connor ). The entire discourse of the “places of memory”
[in French, lieux de mémoire] studied by Pierre Nora develops this kind
of perspective when iconically or symbolically representing a past
ontology, through either verbal or non–verbal artifacts (Nora –;
). The nostalgic discourse on the past, on the contrary, which is
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common in the abovementioned rhetoric of ‘present–bashing’, also
refers to remote historical periods but focuses on their ending. In
present–day Iran, for example, citizens who are disappointed with
the socio–economic consequences of the  predominantly Islamic
revolution often develop a discourse in which their country is seen as
having experienced the peak of prosperity under the government of
the last Shah, an epoch that is represented as irremediably lost as a
consequence of the revolution (Milani ).
The aspectual dialectics concerning the representation of the past
can also oppose other semantic features, such as punctuality and
durativity. Most modern societies implicitly or explicitly institute a
symbolical calendar of salient dates, which stand out by virtue of their
historical, social, or religious relevance. In commemorating saints, for
instance, the Catholic semiosphere circulate texts that represent the
past at a specific point of its development (Leone ). In this case,
however, the focus is neither on the beginning nor on the end. The
chosen date, indeed, does usually relate to a punctual event in the life
of a saint, such as a beginning (birth) or an end (death), but this origin
is usually disregarded or even forgotten by popular piety, for which
the position of the commemoration in the Catholic calendar is rather
arbitrary and gives rise to a sort of recurrent punctuation of the year
(Wuerl and Aquilina ).
The past, however, can be commemorated also in its continuous
tense, for instance, when the either material or emotional effects of
a past event or epoch are seen as prolonged through the past itself
toward the present. Given such aspectual semantics, texts and repre-
sentations of the past do not simply institute a punctuated calendar,
but seek to continuously rekindle a remote era through showing its
impact on the present community. As in all the aspectual rhetorics
described above, in this case too, representations can be underpinned
by either a positive or a negative connotation. On the one hand, the
present–day Argentinian society seeks to keep the memory of the
desaparecidos alive, for instance, through showing pictures of their
student IDs as posters in the main hall of the University of Buenos
Aires (Faculty of Architecture) (Violi ); on the other hand, the past
can continue through the present with a positive, beneficial connota-
tion, for example, under the form of cyclical ritualization; such is the
case of miracles that, in the Catholic semiosphere, keep occurring in
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the present, year after year, as they occurred in the past, such as the
liquefaction of Saint Januarius’s blood in Naples every September 
(Saint Januarius’s Day, commemorating his martyrdom), December
 (celebrating his patronage of Naples and its archdiocese), and on
the Saturday before the first Sunday of May (commemorating the
reunification of his relics) (Sallmann ).
Whereas the past is, ontologically, something that is not anymore,
semiospheres construct a semiotic memory of it through indexically
project on such past time a grid meant to articulate it, measure it,
and, above all, allowing communities to establish a significant relation
between such memory of the past, the present, and the expectation or
planning of the future. The semiotic rekindling of the past, however, is
never purely indexical; relics themselves, for instance, need an entire
cultural (and, therefore, symbolical) framework in order to function as
signs of the past that physically caused them or was in spatio–temporal
contiguity with them (Leone  Wrapping). As a consequence, verbal
and non–verbal artifacts seek to signify a past that is ontologically
absent (but that is phenomenologically present in people’s memories)
through either iconic or symbolical strategies, adopting verbal or
non–verbal means. In doing so, texts usually chose to valorize not
only when a given ontology took place, but also how it did so. They
therefore position themselves within the aspectual dialectics mainly
offered by verbal language but also, to a lesser extent, by other systems
of signs, in order to express a preference for the beginning of the
past, for its ending, for its punctuality, for its durativity, etc. Each
of these temporal and aspectual choices, then, can be attributed an
either euphoric or dysphoric value, depending on the place that the
represented time occupies in the shared narrative of its rekindling.
. Ideologies of the future
Such typology symmetrically presents itself as regards the future too.
The ontology of the future, however, is different from that of the past.
Whereas the past vanishes while leaving traces of it that can turn into
signs to recover its memory, the future pertains to an ontology that, by
definition, is not yet (Gidley ). The custom of seeking to forecast
the future through the signs of divination is immemorial (Leone 
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Sulla chiromanzia), whereas one of the marks of modernity is the thirst
for statistically anticipating the future through rational procedures
(Leone ). In both cases, though, the relation between signs and
the ontology of either the past or the future is radically different. On
the one hand, a ruin reminds us of the past building it was part of
for an indexical relation of physical contiguity obtained between the
dilapidated piece of marble that we see and the majestic temple it
belonged to (Leone  On Broken). When semiotically foreseeing the
future, instead, the relation that divination establishes between signs
and an ontology yet to be is totally arbitrary, although it is usually
travestied as a pseudo–indexical one; but also statistical methods of
forecasting cannot rely on the same signs that the archeologist refers
to so as to reconstruct the past; that which the former deal with,
indeed, are not signs of a future ontology but rather signs of a past
ontology that closely resembles that which may occur in the future.
Similarly, seismographers seeking to predict a future earthquake do
not collect indexes of the earthquake but indexes of a present situation
that is similar to those which, in the past, gave rise to earthquakes.
This is a general semiotic law: per definition, indexes of the future do
not exist; the future can be signified only through iconic or symbolical
representations.
That, nevertheless, does not amount to deny the fact that the
future can be indexically measured. We can project a calendar onto
the foreseeable development of the future exactly as we do it with
the past, but in this case too, the grid that articulates the ontology
of time in a given culture will not segment an ontology that was
and is not anymore, but one that is not yet and (probably) might be.
Our conception of mathematical infinitude allows us to imagine a
calendar that stretches beyond the end of the physical universe, as we
can imagine a date on an imaginary calendar one day before the big
bang. In the former case, though, the grid is not simply imaginary
but virtual; the world might exist tomorrow, or might not: my future
calendar is there, ready, awaiting the inexorable fading of the present
into the future.
Differences between iconic and symbolical representations of the
past on the one hand, and analogous representations of the future
on the other, are less dramatic. When we construct a mental image
of the future we do so without any reference to an actual ontology,
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but since the relation between sign (representamen) and object, in
the case of both icons and symbols, is not one based on causal conti-
guity, differences between texts that recount the past through iconic
simulacra or arbitrary connotation and texts that imagine the future
through similar means are not so sharp. That is probably the reason
for which many thinkers and philosophers of the past have pointed
out and formulated the idea of a symmetry between a past that “is no
longer” and a future that “is not yet”. In reality, such symmetry holds
as regards icons and symbols of either the past or the future but not
as regards their indexes. It is true that the past is no longer, but the
traces of it that it leaves behind are indexically related to it, whereas
there are no indexes we can rely on in our present perception so as to
signify the future in the same compelling way in which we signify the
past (Gatard ).
This asymmetry begets important consequences in the functioning
of different temporal and aspectual cultures in the semiosphere. Peo-
ple might want to seek comfort from an excruciating present through
delving into an elaborate imagination of the future, yet the pragmatic
force of such imagination will always be inferior to that which exudes
from an elaborate reconstruction of the past. That might be the reason
for which, in times of deep crises, cultures more compulsively seek
refuge in the past than in the future. But that might also be a conse-
quence of the prevailing semiotic ideology of representation, pushing
the members of a culture to prefer more tangible representations of
non–present ontologies.
Given this fundamental difference, though, many verbal systems
of representation possess specific semiotic means so as to depict the
future as they do to represent the past. Future tenses are common
in Indo–European languages (De Brabanter, Kissine, and Sharifzadeh
), probably signaling also a temporal ideology for which it is im-
portant to distinguish between phenomena that are, phenomena that
were and are not any more, and phenomena that are not yet. Semio-
spheres in which a temporal ideology of the future prevails will, then,
circulate an abundance, if not a majority, of texts in which future tenses
are used but also, as it was pointed out as regards the past too, texts
in which the future occupies the narrative role of an object of value.
Such is the case of historical periods in which prophecies of an immi-
nent radical change start to permeate the public discourse (Murphy
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and Jeffcoat Schedtler ), like in the feverish period that precedes
a revolution, or in millenarianisms (Frykholm ), when tales of
future and irreparable catastrophes become the textual environment
in which members of a semiosphere leave their daily semiotic life (Yar
). All these textual genres (divinations, vaticinations, prophecies,
revolutionary scenarios, etc.) partake of the fictionality that is intrinsic
in all non–indexical signs, yet they do not present themselves as pure
icons, or as pure symbols, but as texts that are somehow able to read
the signs that, in the present, a future yet to come mysteriously pro-
duces in anticipation of its occurrence. Other kinds of texts, instead,
such as, typically, science fiction representations, do not claim for
themselves such capacity, but openly declare their iconic or symboli-
cal nature. They do not pretend to expose the indexes of the future
that the present contains (which is semiotically impossible per se),
but to offer analogies and connotations that, on the basis of what is
known about the past and the present, anticipate a surprising and yet
somehow believable image of what is yet to come (Burton ).
The primary modeling system of language stems from the position-
ing of a virtual observer in relation to the present ontology (the only
proper ontology), a positioning which gives rise to both a temporal
grid and its aspectual nuances. These concern not only the past but
also the future. Out typology must, then, be further enriched.
.. The past of the future and the future of the past
Before dwelling on the aspectual cultures of the future and their
euphoric or dysphoric colorations, another structural feature of the
semiotic ideology of time of many Indo–European languages and
societies must be expounded upon. The temporal grid through which
language, as well as other non–verbal temporal diagrams, ‘capture’
the ontology of time and iconically render it through their signifying
structures, contain a virtual possibility that some verbal morphologies
actualize and exploit: verbal language can not only represent a past
ontology or simulate a future one. It can also verbally depict the
future of the past and the past of the future. A verbal tense like the
Italian “anterior future” [“future anteriore”], for instance, structurally
aims at evoking a past ontology, which is nevertheless seen from the
perspective of a more remote past and, therefore, as a future ontology
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for such point of view.
Underlying the existence and the systemic place of such possibility
of temporal signification is important also in the terms of a semiotics
of temporal ideologies. Although the anterior future sounds like a
future from a semiotic point of view, from a strictly ontological per-
spective it is not one. It iconically renders a past ontology as well,
something that, from the point of view of enunciation, is not anymore
but something that, from the point of view that the enunciation situ-
ates in an even more remote past, is not yet. The asymmetry between
the anterior future and the future is evident but can be fully grasped
only if the indexical rendering of a future ontology and its iconic
representation through verbal language are kept apart. When using
the future tense we depict a time that is ontologically absent, whilst
when using the anterior future we semiotically simulate such absence,
for the time represented by this tense is actually part of the past, that
is, it was already and, as a consequence, has left some traces of itself in
the present. That is the main reason for which, as I have pointed out
in other essays (Leone  Longing), the anterior future is the tense
of nostalgia, not only in verbal representations but also and above all
in sociocultural practices that incarnate and express the same tense
through other systems of signs.
Vintage, retro, and other aesthetic trends, as well as all kinds of
‘retrotopias’ do not simply revere the past, but often revere a past that
is inscribed in the temporal ideology of an anterior future. In other
words, a vintage aficionado does not adhere to the same temporal
ideology as, for instance, a retrograde nationalist. The latter worships
an event or era in the past for he or she considers them as the point of
beginning of a glorious past, which is either lost or endangered in the
present. The former, instead, does not see in some hipster traces of the
past simply the relics of a remote and more euphoric temporal phase,
but also the remnants of a past in which the future was expectantly
and euphorically awaited. On the one hand, fascists collect relics or
pseudo–relics of the Roman past (also through mimicking it in verbal
language and architecture) for they venerate it as the mythical past
beginning of the ‘Italic civilization’; on the other hand, hipsters collect
. See, in this volume, the essay of Gabriele Marino, which articulates a typology of
musical nostalgias.
Time and Meaning 
relics or pseudo–relics of the s not because this decade is seen as
the glorious past incipit of the present but because, quite contrarily, it
is cherished as the last decade in Italian history in which youngsters
would expectantly look at the future. In this as in similar ‘retrotopias’
that refer not to the past but to the future of the past, the temporal
ideology that emerges is not simply a retrograde one but one that,
albeit being projected toward the future, prefers to seek it not in the
uncertain area of the ontological future, but in the reassuring dimen-
sion of the semiotic future that which language iconically depicts as
‘the future of the past’. Both retrogrades and retrotopians implicitly
flee from the ontology and from the semiotics of the present, and
both shun the uncertainty of the future, seen as either the expected
copy of a more glorious past (the fascist) or an era that, given the de-
terioration of the present state, will never matches such glorious past
(the hipster). The former, however, reassure themselves by rekindling
the past, while the latter comfort themselves by rekindling the future
of the past.
The verbal morphology of many Indo–European languages allows
one also to represent the past of the future. Such possibility and
the relative temporal ideology are particularly effective in providing
motivation for a representation of the future that, as it was pointed out
earlier, is doomed to be fictional. Hollywood movies more and more
frequently resort to such temporal modality in order to fictionally
reconstruct the historical genesis of a future catastrophe, cataclysm, or
future development (Heinze and Krämer ). In movies, we do not
only see that the earth has been conquered by apes, we are also told
the story that, being the past of such future, led to it. The rhetorical
effect of such temporal construction is evident: every time that, in
a narrative, a future becomes the past of a more distant future, the
former is somehow motivated by the second by virtue of a sort of
mise en abyme. The meaning effect is analogous to that of a visual
representation embedding an analogous visual representation: when
in a advertisement image some fresh tomatoes are represented beside
a can of tomato soup, the former inevitably look like ‘real’ tomatoes
and convey, thus, the idea that they constitute the genuine content of
the soup.
. This technique for the induction of a reality–effect was already experimented in
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Both the future of the past and the past of the future, therefore,
entail a persuasive effect, which reassures one about the existence of
the future by projecting it either into the past as its future (nostalgia
of the future) or into a more distant future as its future (genealogy of
the future). In both cases, a temporal dimension that is, by definition,
devoid of any ontology, is referentialized through either projection or
retro–jection.
.. The emptiness of the future
Most temporal ideologies and rhetorics, indeed, explicitly or implic-
itly revolve around the same existential issue of seeking to provide
a fundament for the representation of a temporal dimension, that of
the future, that does not entail a proper ontology. The human species
is endowed with the cognitive ability of formulating verbal and non–
verbal simulacra representing possible future developments of present
states (Leone ). We can both elaborate a verbal prophecy about
when we shall die or represent it through a painting or a movie,
although the first system of signs is more powerful and articulate
than any other. The inevitable emotional byproduct of such cogni-
tive ability is anxiety: we know from bitter experience that some of
our simulacra of the future prove correct by the turning of the fu-
ture into present, whereas others are proven wrong, sometimes with
catastrophic consequences. As a result, we develop both verbal and
non–verbal persuasive strategies so as to attribute ontological solidity
to the future. The morphology of verbal forms meant to express the
future is one of the most peremptory rhetorical means seeking to
reassure human beings about such uncertain ontology. When I say “I
shall buy a new car tomorrow”, I always know that this sentence is,
by definition, devoid of any ontology and that it actually constitutes
a verbal simulacrum fictionally representing a possible (but never
certain!) future development of the present state; yet, the fact itself of
expressing the possibility of a future through such tense confers to it
a pseudo–ontological firmness.
painting; see Bokody .
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.. Future aspectualities
The future, however, is referred to not only as temporal dimension
but also as temporal dimension that is looked at from the perspec-
tive of a particular aspect. In many verbal morphologies, a perfect
symmetry obtains between the array of aspectual dialectics that can
invest the representation of the past and that which can nuance the
temporal representation of the future. The question of determining
whether these aspectual modalities also give rise to as many aspectual
ideologies, interacting and sometimes conflicting in the semiosphere,
is more complicated. On the one hand, some cultures tend to deal
with the future as punctual aspect of value, positing in their calendar
a forthcoming instant that is seen either with vibrant expectation or
with terror, but that is conceived of, in any case, as a singular, isolated,
and unrepeatable event. Lars von Trier beautifully dismaying movie
Melancholia () offers a metaphor of the existential condition of
doom by staging the emotions of a community that awaits, terrified,
the impact of an asteroid on the earth. The Christian eschatology,
symmetrically, injects into the semiosphere verbal and non–verbal
texts that revolve around a valorization of the future as instant, seen
as either glorious or terrifying depending on everyone’s destiny at
Doomsday. Paintings contribute to represent this momentous inter-
ruption of history as an instant frozen in time: Christ raises his judging
arm and does not move (Leone  The Frowning).
The future, however, can be valorized also according to a durative
aspectual ideology. Socio–political discourses of progress, for instance,
do not circulate texts that simply foresee a punctual catastrophe or
an instant liberation in the remote future, but a temporal framework
of improvement that stretches from the present to infinity through
progressive and steady amelioration (Wagner ). Whereas punctual
ideologies of the future tend to close the horizon of human experience
within an either tragic or luminous circle, durative ideologies of the
future open such horizon toward a temporal progression whose end
is not foreseeable if not in the form of the abstract idea of a paradisiac
future state.
Articulating such oppositions between aspectual ideologies in a
diagram like the Greimassian square, one can realize that they can
sometimes hold a relation of suspension or co–presence of their re-
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spective semantic values, for instance, in the aspectual ideologies of
revolution: those who, in  Paris or in  Teheran, dreamed of
a revolution, adhered to iconic representations of a future time that
would depict it both as liberating instant and as point of departure of
an undetermined progression toward human improvement.
As in aspectual ideologies of the past, so in those of the future
too, the accent of valorization can fall not only within the dialectics
between punctuality and durativity but also within the one opposing
different stages in the development of the future itself. On the one
hand, cultures might circulate verbal and non–verbal texts that empha-
size the inchoate aspect not of a past epoch but of a future eon. In such
cases, the future, or rather an instant in the future extension of time,
becomes the mythical point of departure of an epoch (usually not a
point but a period) that is seen as more ahead in time and radically
different from what comes before. Narratives of ‘new beginnings’
systematically resort to and incarnate this aspectual ideology; a typical
example of it can be found in mythologies of liberation: enslaved pop-
ulations or oppressed minorities elaborate and diffuse paradigmatic
tales in which that which is highlighted is the watershed that will
be created, in the future, between what comes before the moment
of liberation and what comes after. In such narratives, the aspectual
structure of narrative valorization associates the instant of the future
turning point with all sorts of equally powerful and decisive figures,
including the character of the savior. The savior (or the libertador) will
come and such arrival will change history.
Narratives that valorize the inchoate aspect of the future, however,
can be dysphoric too: the future arrival of a natural disaster, or rather
the invasion of an enemy population, is seen as the future beginning
of the end (Leone Forthcoming). Nations (and semiospheres) that
live under the constant threat of a hostile frontier nation (and semio-
sphere), such as present–day South Korea, for example, give rise to
iconic representations of the future that contain the anguishing instant
starting from which ‘life as we know it will be lost forever’.
Fictions of the ‘end of history’, on the contrary, usually attribute
cognitive and emotional value to the ending of the future (Fukuyama
). In such case, the watershed imagined in a future time separates
incommensurable entities, one that corresponds to an actual ontology
and one that, on the opposite, stems from the separation from time
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and being: after the final instant, that which is will be forever, and that
which is not, won’t. Religious eschatologies often produce narratives
in which the ‘end of time’ is not followed by a proper new epoch but
by a time that is not actually one, since it is destined not to flow ahead
anymore (Byerly and Silverman ).
Aspectual ideologies of the future valorizing its durativity are diffi-
cult to exemplify, since they represent a sort of contradiction: given
that, by definition, iconic representations of the future do not refer
to any actual ontology, but limit themselves to simulate one, they
can hardly emphasize the durative aspect, since they cannot rekindle
an ontology, as durative ideologies of the past usually do. Simulacra
of the future can, nevertheless, resort to the aspectual figure of the
eternal return, that is, not to an ideology of durativity but to one of
ciclicity: the future, in such case, is neither something that begins
nor something that ends, and it is not something that lasts either but
something that keeps reoccurring on and on into the future time.
.. Cyclic aspectualities
The aspectual cyclicity of the past is different from that of the future. In
order to understand such difference, the structural nature of cyclicity
itself must be understood. As it has been pointed out earlier, the tem-
poral phase of the future, to which no ontology actually corresponds,
can be looked at by either iconic or symbolical representations that
chose among opposite tendencies of various aspectual dialectics; they
can either, as we have seen, euphorically or dysphorically emphasize
the initial moment of a future era or they can stress the final instant
of a future series of events. Playing with another opposition, whose
possibility is mainly inscribed in the morphology of the primary mod-
eling system, that is, verbal language, but can be found also in other
systems of signs — although with the difficulties that were described
earlier — such representations of a future state of events — by defi-
nition, an imaginary one — can either represent it as continuous or
as punctual. The semantic articulation of this opposition, however,
also includes the possibility of a co–presence of these aspectual marks,
that precisely occurs in cyclicity (Toivonen, Csuri, and Zee ): in
cyclical aspectuality, an event both takes place in an precise instant
and keeps repeating in time at equal temporal intervals (Chen ).
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The aspectuality of the event is, therefore, both punctual and dura-
tive, giving rise to the complex semantic term of iterativity (which
linguists usually oppose to semelfactivity, that is, the aspectual quality
of something that occurs only once in time).
It seems, as a consequence, that the opposition between iterativity
(or cyclicity, a word that designates the same aspectual structure but
emphasizes its revolving topology rather than its intermittent rhythm)
and semelfactivity is not independent but is somehow a specification
(an over–aspectualization, one might say) of the opposition between
punctuality and durativity: a text first situates an actant observer that
sees the punctuality of an event, then situates an actant observer that
focuses on the opposite semantic aspectual feature, noticing that the
same event keeps occurring along a stretch of time. The propensity
to adopt this kind of semantically complex perspective toward the
past is typical of the philosopher of history: at least from Vico on,
an important trend in the philosophy of history has revolved around
the attitude of seeing the succession of human events not as random
sequence or as progression but as series of states characterized by
cyclical structure, in which salient states of the same nature tend to
occur and reoccur at regular intervals and according to a cyclical
structure (Cacciatore ; Mali ).
The insurgence of the French revolution, for instance, is not simply
considered as punctual event in the past and, therefore, regarded from
the perspective of punctuality and semelfactivity, but rather as an
element in a more complex and iterative pattern, wherein periods of
conservatism are followed by periods of innovation, which sometimes
accelerate and condensate into revolutionary explosions. Such was
also the aspectual perspective of the semiotics of history formulated by
Jurij M. Lotman, which was certainly also inspired by Vico’s aspectual
attitude (Lotman ; cfr Frank, Ruhe, and Schmitz ). This can
be either euphoric or dysphoric: we can both rejoice at the periodic
resurgence of saintly prophets in the religious history of humanity
and mourn the reoccurring tendency of human beings to segregate
and oppress minorities. In general, though, the fact itself of spotting
a cyclical nature in the past encourages one to look at it in a more
dispassionate way: a tragic event that is inserted in a cyclical pattern
will necessarily be followed by a more euphoric state, and vice versa,
a happy circumstance in human history will inexorably be marred
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by deterioration and decay, until an opposite desolation, or even a
catastrophe, occurs.
The precise structure with which the cyclical pattern of the past
is looked at is determined by its rhythm, which is also an indexical
consequence of the ontology of things: some events in reality ‘ex-
plode’, some other events evolve into their final conditions, and this
alternation of explosions and evolutions is exactly the ontological char-
acteristic that language seeks to render first indexically, through the
institution of chronology, and then iconically, through representations
of the past that grasp not only its cyclical nature but also the precise
pattern with which this cyclicity takes place.
No matter what the pattern of cyclity is, however, spotting it into
the past is somehow conducive to ataraxia: things do not only happen;
they keep happening. There is no need in worrying about a sad event
or to be elated about a happy one: what is euphorically seen will be
superseded by its dysphoric opposite, and vice versa. That relates
also to the aspectual divergence between –emic and –etic aspectual
perspectives on human facts: for those who experience an earthquake,
for example, the catastrophe is a punctual event, represented and felt as
irremediable destructor of lives and life environment; from the point
of view of the philosopher of history, though, or also from the point
of view of the geologist, the earthquake is not any longer the punctual
event that has destroyed lives, but an element in a more complex and
cyclical series of circumstances, in which moments and periods of
destruction are followed by moments and periods of reconstruction:
there is no reason for extolling a palace, since it will be destroyed in
time by a calamity; but there is no reason for mourning its destruction
either, for it will be reconstructed.
Adopting an aspectual perspective that realizes the cyclicity of
human events in the past, however, is different from inscribing the
same perspective in iconic representations of the future. As it has
been underlined many times already, the texts that a semiosphere
circulates as simulacra of future states cannot indexically refer to any
ontology: the future is not seen but foreseen. The contrast between
this empty ontology and the cognitive ability to represent it generates
an anxiety that is typical and, perhaps, characteristic of the human
kind. Divination, however, is not the only strategy to ‘tame’ such
uncertainty; projecting the cyclical aspectuality of the past into the
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future allows one to better bear with disasters and calamities, personal
failures and social catastrophes: no matter what will happen in the
future, it will be followed by better conditions of life, since the cyclicity
itself of human history entails it. Such soothing aspectual ideology,
however, consists not only in foreseeing the iterativity of the future,
but also in somehow planning it through the adoption of rituals.
A ritual, indeed, from this point of view, is nothing but a semiotic
machine meant to generate cyclicity in future ontologies (Leone 
Rituals). “Do this in memory of me”: by instituting the Eucharistic
ritual and sacrament, Jesus provides his followers not only with a
powerful mnemotechnique, thanks to which they will periodically
remember him, but also with a powerful generator of cyclicity; the
future, whose ontology is not only absent and uncertain, but also
tragically bereft of Jesus’s presence on earth, is sweetened by the
institution of a ritual whose aspectual consequence is that of bringing
about a relieving cyclicity; every Sunday, at every mass, Jesus will
relive among his faithful. More trivially, but not less importantly, we
celebrate birthdays not only as indexical projections, in the social
calendar, of the yearly distance from our birth in the social calendar
but also as instances of a rituality that, too, seeks to cope with the
bitter taste of an absent ontology: another year will come, and we’ll
celebrate again, seeking to remember that, one day, celebrations will
end, and us with them.
. Ideologies of the present
It is time now to tackle the most difficult aspect of aspectuality and its
ideologies: after briefly dealing with aspectual ideologies of the past
and the future, it is imperative to dwell on aspectual ideologies of the
present. On the one hand, hinting at the possibility of an ideological
valorization of the present seems pleonastic or even absurd: human
beings experience the present moment after moment and they can
conjure a past or imagine a future only by temporarily distracting
themselves from the present in which they inexorably live. Mental
images of the past and the future, moreover, although ‘encouraged’
by signs of the latter (relics) and of the former (omens) that are dis-
seminated in the present, can be semiotically and even linguistically
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constructed only from the point of view of this last temporal eon.
As Émile Benveniste first formally intuited, the abstract enunciation
point from which the future and the past, as well as any beyond, can
be linguistically evoked, inevitably places itself in the phenomenologi-
cal present that is occupied by the mind and the body of the speaker.
I can say “I shall buy a car tomorrow”, but this verbal evocation of
a future state of the world has its technical roots in the present, in
here, in my persona. An essential dissymmetry, then, holds between
the ideological valorizations of the past and the future, on the one
hand, and apparently similar ideological valorizations of the present,
on the other hand. “Cultures of the present” basically arise as a result
of the systematic effort of blocking the switch between the present
awareness and the imaginary transportation to either the past, through
remembrance, or the future, through fiction (the separation between
the two mental processes is, of course, not so sharp: there is a lot of fic-
tion in remembrance, and a lot of remembrance in fiction). Ideologies
of the present are not, nevertheless, more ‘natural’ than ideologies of
the past and the future. They might seem so because human beings
phenomenologically live in the present, but that is also a consequence
of an ideological construction itself (Huber ). In reality, blocking
the switch that leads from this present phenomenology to a remem-
brance of the past or to a fiction of the future requires an effort, which
is sometimes enormous.
As regards the switch between the present and the past, it is all the
more obvious to consider it as an effort to ‘block’ it or to ‘hamper’
it when one considers that, both at the individual and at the social
level, an ars oblivionalis does not exist; an equivalent of the many
mnemotechniques that have been invented and experimented with
more or less success throughout history, and on which an abundant
literature is extant, does not exist as regards the art of forgetting. That
was a central preoccupation of the late Umberto Eco, who underlined
in several essays that there is a semiotic dissymmetry between forget-
ting and remembering (Eco ); probably for evolutionary reasons,
our cognition exerts an active agency as regards remembrance (to
a certain extent, at least), meaning that we can voluntarily decide to
remember a phone number or the name of a person, but no agency
whatsoever as regards oblivion (we cannot in any way decide to for-
get a word, or a face). That has probably to do with the fact that
 Massimo Leone
memorizing and keeping in our mind, at least for a certain time, the
memories of past unpleasant events and experiences is useful for us
not to undergo the same experience again; were we to exert direct
and intentional agency on our memory, on the opposite, we would be
inclined to immediately remove any painful memory, losing, thus, the
possibility of learning from it (Draaisma ). Blocking or thwarting
the switch from the present phenomenology to the recollection of
the past is, therefore, somewhat unnatural, in the sense that, at the
individual level, it gives rise to an attitude and practice of system-
atic removal, a condition on the pathological implications of which
abundant psychoanalytical literature exists.
Removal, though, can permeate a temporal ideology also at the
level of society (Plate ). There are human groups in which such
systematic oblivion of the past is not spontaneous but imposed by
power with the aim of bringing about that which commonly goes
under the name of damnatio memoriae (Augé ): with the advent of
the new leader, the society as a whole is encouraged and sometimes
even forced to get rid of all signs that might work as relics of an unde-
sired past: in these cases, the temporal ideology that prevails works
symmetrically to the monumentalization of the past that is typical of
nationalisms. The two and their relative practices can actually coexist,
for instance in dictatorships, that simultaneously remove all traces of
previous democratic regimes and figures and build their symbolical
pantheon and pedigree by extolling the memory of previous dicta-
torial periods and protagonists (Mussolini with Caesar, for example).
Both the social and the psychological ideologies of the present oper-
ate by eliminating from the personal or social entourage a series of
signs that are closely or even remotely connected with a past epoch
(Weinrich ): a person will avoid certain streets, pictures, or songs
etc. so as to limit or avoid any access to a past whose remembrance is
saddened with the presence of a lost beloved one; a society will reduce
or erase statues, plaques, festivities, etc. so as to block the temporal
switch that leads from the present to a previous painful or disdained
historical period.
Temporal ideologies of the present, however, usually do not in-
volve only the systematic erasure of such or such wounding or enemy
memory but also the disabling of the switch itself that allows individu-
als and especially groups to transfer from the phenomenology of the
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present and its ontological fullness to the fantasmatic phenomenology
of the past. In radical or even extremist ideologies of the past, it is not
a particular memory that is eliminated or a range of souvenirs but the
practice itself of passing from the perceived present to the conjured
or recollected past. Those individuals or groups that, voluntarily or
involuntarily, adhere to such ideology do not limit themselves not to
remember something; they do not remember anything; and that is
the case not because they cannot remember, as in the circumstance
of a pathological amnesia, but because they do not value the access
to reconstructed mental images of past events any longer. Hence,
an amnesic aesthetics takes place. Given the natural propensity of
human beings to refer to the past, developing an individual or social
amnesia does not usually involve an effort but is the consequence of a
trauma: the individual is so anguished by the possibility of reminiscing
some painful events that he or she does not try to eliminate a specific
memory or a range of souvenirs but puts the entire mechanism of
remembrance itself into brackets. The same goes for societies: those
of them that embrace, often unconsciously, an extreme temporal ide-
ology of the present do not forget only one period, one memory, or a
determined series of them, they rather adopt the moral suggestion
of the famous Neapolitan song: “those who received, received, those
who gave, gave, let’s forget about the past, we’re all from Naples, com-
rade!” In more explicit terms, in extreme temporal ideologies of the
present, people and groups leave in a constant obnubilation, in which
any mental or psychosocial bridging toward the past is systematically
discouraged. Ideologies of the present are quite successful in times
of crises of various kinds for they are, at least at first sight, relaxing:
anything that might bother from the past is simply erased from the
scene, and the entire past with it.
The current evolution of most psychotherapy can exemplify this
. Connerton  articulates social oblivion as follows: repressive erasure; prescrip-
tive forgetting; forgetting that is constitutive in the formation of a new identity; structural
amnesia; forgetting as annulment; forgetting as planned obsolescence; forgetting as humil-
iated silence; that which is at stake here is similar to Connerton’s “structural amnesia”; see
also Connerton .
. Such ‘amnesiology’ would be the counterpart of Derrida’s ‘hauntology’ (Derrida
).
. Song “Simmo ’e Napule paisà” (); lyrics by Peppino Fiorelli; music by Nicola
Valente.
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trend in an interesting way. In psychoanalysis, and especially in the
classical Freudian one, minutely reconstructing the complexity of a
patient’s childhood and family relations so as to ascertain how they
impacted on the adult psyche of the individual is paramount; it is actu-
ally one of the main tenets of the whole Freudian epistemology: the
past can explain the present (Strenger ). In most present–day psy-
chotherapy (CBT), on the contrary, the patient is almost discouraged
to overthink about her or his distant past, as if the painful present was
a temporal dimension somehow disconnected from what preceded it.
The perspective toward past memories is actually reversed: the patient
is believed not to gain anything from remembering her or his child-
hood relation with her or his parents; this recollection is, in the eyes of
predominant contemporary psychotherapy, nothing but an harmful
effort to a posteriori justify some present painful conditions (Slife and
Williams ). A complex relation obtains between such focalization
on the present — and the simultaneous devaluation of the past — in
present–day psychotherapy and the raising of individualism: the more
a society becomes individualistic, the more it tends to devaluate the
influence of the context, be it social or psychological, and, therefore,
underestimate the importance of the past. Present–day psychotherapy
seems to imply that the individual is what it is not because a past has
decided for it but because he or she has decided to recollect a certain
past as an alibi, which works as fictional background to her or his
present cognitions, emotions, and actions.
At both the individual and the social level, extreme ideologies
of the present that obliterate the past are dangerous for the same
reasons for which remembering is a compulsory and adaptive human
activity: both individuals and societies learn from the past; the goal
of psychoanalysis, just to continue with this example, is not to delve
into the familial past of a patient but to delve into it in a way that
identifies plausible causal relations between a present psychopathology
and past family configurations. On the one hand, bad psychoanalysis
sometimes concocts mythical and even absurd etiologies, which in the
end prove useless or even detrimental to liberating the patient from
her or his dolorous condition; on the other hand, that does not justify
a generalized stigmatization of the whole Freudian method. Thinking
of the individual as living in a present that is constantly disconnected
from its remote past turns her or his actions into mere immediate
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reactions to the present environment, without due consideration for
the way in which such environment is filtered by the semiotic patterns
and habits that have crystallized throughout the entire patient’s life
and, perhaps, especially in the first years of her or his emotional
existence (Fancher ).
Similarly, a society that does not cultivate a reasonable devotion to
the past is condemned to repeat its mistakes. That does not mean that
the mere commemoration of the past is sufficient to generate progress
in human history, and to avoid that, for instance, meaningless wars are
waged around the globe. Unfortunately, thus far, the construction of
monumental war cemeteries has not prevented societies from engag-
ing in devastating wars over and over again. On the contrary, reacting
to the ideologies of obnubilation should entail refraining from yielding
to the opposite risk of embracing chauvinistic ideologies of the past
or sterile self–victimizing and should encourage cultivating, instead,
the art of reasonable etiology, which is part of the more encompassing
art of historical hermeneutics. In the present, that which matters is
not remembering the past per se. What matters is, first, discovering,
in the past, patterns whose configurations are analogous to those that
are observed in fieri in the present; and, second, formulating plausible
hypotheses about the genealogy of the present from the past. That is
the case at both the individual and the social level.
Radical ideologies of the present, however, do not cause only the
obliteration of the past but also that of the future. As it was suggested
earlier, ideologies of the past are frequently embraced by human
beings and groups so as to soothe the uncertainty of the future: given
the empty ontology and the statutory unpredictability of this temporal
eon, individuals and societies start obsessively delving into their past,
diverting their attention from the present but, above all, from the
future. Extreme ideologies of the present are motivated by the same
anxiety but they give rise to different side effects. Indeed, even though
the mania for relics of nationalist pseudo–monuments distracts a
collectivity from the anxious need for imagining a future, it does
not disrupt, notwithstanding, the faculty of imagination itself too.
Reconstructing the past from traces or pseudo–traces of it, indeed,
inevitably relies on the human cognitive capacity for switching from
the present perception of the world to the imagination of possible
worlds, which are ontologically absent but semiotically hinted at
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by their relics. The nostalgic, the nationalist, and the hipster do not
abdicate such faculty of imagination but simply reorient its efforts
toward the past instead of aiming at the imagination and planning of
the future.
The ideologies of the present, on the contrary, do not obliterate
only the past and the future but also the human propensity itself for
mentally and linguistically accessing possible worlds. From this point
of view, the radicalization of these ideologies is even more dangerous.
It leads to the paralysis, or at least to the ankylosis, of an essential
human faculty, one that has been probably selected throughout natural
history as adaptive for its ability to allow human beings and groups to
better cope with sudden modifications of the environment, and not
through experience but through prevention. In the long perspective of
natural history, the superiority of the latter approach over the former
is evident: those who must experience dangers in order to avoid them
are likely to succumb to such dangers in the short period. It is only
through imagining both risks and opportunities before they present
themselves that the individual (as well as the society) can survive in
an ever changing natural and cultural context.
The current ideologies of the present, instead, are usually character-
ized by abnormal valorization of experience over planning. Accumu-
lating experience in all fields of human activity, from the sentimental
to the professional one, seems to have become the moral imperative
of the present time; many young people in the west do not know
when and if they will secure a permanent job; when and if they will
have a house; when and if they shall give rise to the next generation.
As a reaction to the current difficulty or even impossibility of planning
a future, they are successfully marketed an aesthetics of the present
in which they even pay for accumulating experience without ever
building or planning anything solid in the future. They travel, eat,
love, and, more generally, consume by simply exposing themselves to
experiences whose purpose is neither that of accumulating as memo-
ries of the past, nor that of turning into the basis for devising a future
but to remain encircled within an epidermal aesthetics, which soothes
the natural anxiety for the future and its empty ontology by caress-
ing the senses with increasingly sophisticated and sundry immediate
environments. In relation to them, what matters is not to learn how
to better react to a certain context, but to enjoy the superposition
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of sensations earned in Umwelt that present themselves as constantly
changing and in which prevision is not an issue.
Contemporary tourism is one of the epitomes of such aesthet-
ics (Frow ). Present–day European youths travel extensively by
means of low cost travel companies, they accumulate experiences,
they are satisfied with a feeling of pseudo–adaptability, and yet what
they adapt to is not the ever changing environment of their own
society, but the pseudo–changing environment of traveling. Through
Google Maps, Tripadvisor, Booking, Airbnb and other apps, travel-
ling nowadays is, in most areas of the world, a mere organizational
routine. Young people enjoy the pride that derives from this pseudo–
adaptability, and forget about developing the skills and attitudes that
are indispensable to survive in their own environment. Similarly, mu-
seums and other traditional cultural institutions are marketed more
and more not as deposits of those signs and texts that are the most
valued in a given culture, but as places that, suitably modified and
arranged, allow one to ‘experience’ fine arts and culture without the
burden of having to develop, through access to these cultural items
themselves, a structured representation of the past. The present is sold
and consumed as vanishing phenomenology that neither accumulates
into the material marks of the past nor solidifies into an image of the
future. Souvenirs are in decline, not only because young people often
do not dispose of physical spaces where to accumulate and arrange
them, but also because material accumulation itself is increasingly
devaluated, in contrast with the immaterial aesthetics of the present
and its experiences.
The vertiginous digitalization of photographs, and the consequent
disappearing of material repositories of images, like photo–albums for
instance (only the vintage or cyber–vintage version of them survives),
contributes to the contemporary radicalization of the ideology and
aesthetics of the present: what matters is taking a picture, better if it
is a selfie, and not to print it, store it, or look at it after a certain time.
Photography, which at its onset inherited from painting the mythical
task of fixating the profile of a fleeting ontology, currently tends to
lose its pragmatic contact with the past: people do not take pictures
anymore because they want to preserve, for the future, images of a
present that will soon become past; they take pictures because they
have learned to readapt this technology of the past to the contempo-
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rary ideology and aesthetics of the present; they take pictures in order
to experience the present as if it had the cultural exclusiveness of a
selected past. They do not take pictures for their future memories but
they attribute memorability to their present pictures.
Analogously, collecting is becoming an elite activity for those who
have money and space to accumulate material items from the past into
the present for the future. For most of us, cultural entities that would
heretofore acquire the status of tangible traces of past intellectual
experiences (books read as children, records listened to as teenagers,
pictures of parties, souvenirs of journeys, letters of friends) are more
and more lost into the invisible ocean of digits of hard disks or, even
more ethereally, into the clouds of digital networks. At the same time,
forms of consumptions that do not produce any trace or accumulation
are at the core of the present cultural industry and marketing. The
most central of them is eating: people nowadays, and especially young
people, do not want to accumulate books, or painting, or even clothes;
they want to consume food and revel into its vanishing aesthetics.
Countless restaurants and bars mushroom in European cities: what
they sell turns into calories, and then into everyday activities, but does
not leave any trace behind, if not the fleeting memory of a taste (but
how many meals are we able to remember?) (Leone  Critique).
Given this characterization of the radical ideologies of the present,
reflecting on their aspectuality is quite pleonastic. It is clear that there
is no particular dialectics between the inchoate, the central, and the
terminative aspect of the present. The ideological valorization of the
present implies extirpating any perception that would hint at its conti-
nuity from the past and into the future. In radical ideologies of the
present, the only aspect that is emphasized is durativity, which is, nev-
ertheless, paradoxically conflated with a sort of bizarre semelfactivity.
When I visit as a tourist a city that I don’t know, for instance, I am
encouraged not to store perceptions into my future memory of the
place, but to be entirely engrossed in the instantaneous and simultane-
ously durative contemplation and aesthetic experience of the urban
environment. That is the reason for which, among young tourists,
‘walking tours’ through cities are now one of the most favorite forms
of visiting them: they allow participant to immerse themselves in the
flux of perception, without bothering too much for the accumulation
of memories and their material counterparts.
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.. The ideology of the selfie
The selfie constitutes the photographic glorification of this attitude:
not only do I look at reality through a camera, that is, through the
idea of a visual present that is attributed the aesthetic validation of
a memorable past, but I even turn my back to reality, and do not
look at it directly anymore, not even in the margins of my visual field
(Kuntsman ); in the selfie, I take an image of the present that
includes myself as being a memorable person, objectifying so to speak
the memory of myself as remembered person (by myself ). In the
selfie, again, I do not take a picture that will allow me to remember
how I was (as in the case of photographic portraits or self–portraits,
for instance) but I take a picture that allows me to perceive myself as
someone to be remembered. The selfie, as most present–day digital
photographs, is a way to bestow to the vanishing present, isolated
from any memory of the past and any plan for the future, the aura of
a visual souvenir, of something that will survive me in the future.
That, however, does not disrupt the aesthetics of the ideological
valorization of the durative aspect of the present but reinforces it: I
shall never look back at my selfie, because I am already looking at
it in the instantaneous and durative moment in which I take it. The
selfie conflates the present moment of the making of a picture of
myself and the potential future moment in which I shall look at such
picture in order to remember how I was: in the selfie, I look at myself
as I am in the making of the selfie itself, and yet this looking at my
own image in the present is not the same as looking at myself in the
mirror. It shares the narcissism of the mirror but at the same time it
absorbs the durativity of a photograph and its traditional connotations
of mnemonic device. The selfie is, as a consequence, the perfect
synthesis between mirror and camera, between a visual device that
captures the present state of myself, delivering an image of it that,
nevertheless, will vanish with my moving far from the mirror, and a
visual device that captures the present state of myself for a potential
future spectatorship. It is as if, by taking selfies, I was granting myself
. Scholarly literature on the selfie is growing but is often too attached to the psy-
chological framework of narcissism. Explaining the diffusion of selfies in these terms is,
perhaps, too simplistic (Pavoncello ; Riva ; Di Gregorio ).
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the possibility to attach a temporal dimension to my mirror, stretching
its reflected image into a possible future (Godart ).
The purpose of a selfie, nevertheless, is not functional but symbolic:
I shall never look at my selfies again, yet I take them as if they were to
become future images of myself to be looked at as visual deposit of
my past identities. From this point of view, being a semiotic hybrid
between a mirrored image and a photographed one, the selfie works
as an index — meaning that it would not be there if the camera had not
been in physical contiguity with my body in the hic et nunc — but also
as an icon — meaning that this mirror actually retains a permanent
picture of such indexical presence of mine — and as a symbol. The
symbolical function of a selfie exactly derives from its conflating
indexical and iconic properties: with digital photography, the ontology
of the photographed object becomes uncertain; by connecting it with
the idea of a firm physical contiguity with my body (through my arm
or its prosthesis, the selfie–stick), I attribute an indexically ontological
aura to digital icons of myself. Selfies are so popular because, in a
temporal ideology of the present, reassure us about our ontological
continuity. They provide a present version of the temporal ideology
of the past and its memories. Selfies are a visual device to remember
the present as present and not as past. They attribute to experience
the phenomenological aura of memory. In a selfie, I remember my
present. It is the epitome of the radicalization of the temporal and
aspectual ideology of the instantaneous, durative present.
Such ideology, then, manifests itself in a myriad of everyday experi-
ences and gadgets, which nevertheless propose, in the present–day
semiosphere, always the same temporal and aspectual attitude: do
not look at the past, it is painful; do not look at the future, it is anguish-
ing; look at the present, at a present that is disconnected from what
precedes it and from what follows it, at a present that manifests itself
as continuous instant, without the burden to remember or to plan,
without the bother to accumulate, without the pain of imagination
and its risks of disillusion.
Bookstores now commonly sell coloring albums for adults (Fig.
): the logic behind them is not any longer that of encouraging
. For a recent, descriptive survey, see http://www.independent.co.uk/extras/indybe-
st/arts-books/colouring-books-colouring-books-for-adults-johanna-basford-millie-
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children to focus on the coloring of empty and beautiful patterns
but to promote, in adults, a full–mindedness that, in the terms of
alternative, more traditional temporal ideologies, would have been
called “absentmindedness”. The current temporal ideology of the
present pushes us to consider that our mind is full when it is not
encumbered with images from the past or with plans for the future;
from the point of view of alternative, previous temporal ideologies,
yet, this full mind would be considered as an empty, or an absent
mind, unable or unwilling to exert its fundamental task of linking the
present ontology with that which begot it and to that which it might
beget.
Figure . J. Basford () Coloring pattern for adults.
Conclusion
According to an easy form of cultural relativism, we should not bother
about the permanence of a certain cultural form in our society because
this form is absent in other societies or presents itself in completely
different ways. As regards the specific domain of the ideologies of
time and aspect, in particular, any deontic consideration about them
morotta-.html.
. Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/extras/indybest/arts-
books/colouring-books-colouring-books-for-adults-johanna-basford-millie-morotta-
.html.
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would be superfluous for, as the new age vulgate says — often on
the basis of sketchy anthropological knowledge — there are distant
cultures, notably in the ‘East’, in which the future does not exist, or at
least, language does not capture it and, as a consequence, people do
not bother about it. The empty ontology of the future is simply not a
problem.
The veracity of such new age clichés should be questioned with
reference to serious scholarly investigation, but that is not the central
issue. The central issue is that this ‘cheap’ cultural relativism relies on
an Orientalistic vision of the East in order to legitimize the radical-
ization of a temporal ideology of the present, and demonstrate that
we, ‘the West’, are ‘wrong’ with our pernicious obsession for the past
and, above all, for the future, whereas in the ‘serene East’ people live
in psychological peace and social harmony exactly because they do
not concentrate, and their languages, religions, and cultures do not
encourage them to concentrate, on what is not yet.
This kind of xenophilia, however, has something paradoxical about
it. The fact that non–Western cultures focus less on the future does not
mean that that is a more ‘natural’ way of dealing with time through
language and culture. On the contrary, one could claim that, with
regards to such matters, the only ‘nature’ that counts is exactly that of
language and the culture that it both gives rise to and is given rise by.
As it is often the case in cultural semiotics, it is more opportune to
reason in terms of ‘second nature’: focusing on the future in language
and culture is not ‘natural’ per se (although the human capacity for
envisaging possible future worlds is), but it is the ‘second nature’ of
the western world. Most of our literature, arts, architecture, not to
speak of philosophy, economy, technology, etc. would be unthinkable
of, and actually would not exist as we know them, without this general
cultural framework that includes a keen attention toward that which
might be.
The western cultures, and most of its languages, are based on an
equilibrate trichotomy and dialectics among the three temporal and
linguistic eons of past, present, and future. Any cultural development
that pushes the western semiosphere to alter such equilibrium, then,
is not negative per se in universal terms but in relation to the very
long period of western cultural history. Temporal obsessions for a
nostalgic past, for a nervous future, or for an obnubilated present,
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indeed, betray one of the central patterns in accordance to which
most western culture has been constructed, the idea that preservation
of memory, delectation of the present, and expectation of the future
should be in constant balance and never prevaricate over each other.
Cultural semioticians do not necessarily endorse an ethics of time,
but limit themselves to warn about the fact that, going astray from
this balance, most of the semiosphere in which we live becomes
unintelligible. Excessive concentration on the past, for instance, risks
to annihilate that instinct for planning that is at the core of so many
manifestations of European culture; exceeding focus on the future,
symmetrically, endangers that cult of past memories that is also an
essential attitude of the western temporal episteme; and the currently
prevailing radical temporal ideology of the present, finally, with its
obsessive diverting from both the past and the future, is probably the
most potentially harmful of them all, since it risks atrophying that
exercise of imagining possible worlds (in terms of simulacra of the
past or future scenarios) that, again, has been an essential fixture of
the western way of approaching meaning in both individual existence
and collective life.
Such a caveat against temporal radicalisms and their cultural conse-
quences is not abstract but relates to a multitude of everyday practices
(Darrault–Harris and Fontanille ), including the kind of syllabi
that are taught in schools, the aesthetic education of youths in society,
and the working of economic institutions such as banks or insurances
(a society in which banks, including the central ones, do not worry
anymore about saving, for instance, eliminate a central economic
practice of western society, which gave rise to the accumulation of
capitals, among other things).
In a nutshell, cultural semioticians should not turn into Savonarolas,
and urge people to burn their smartphones in a present–day version
of bonefires of vanities. Selfies, for instance, are a form of psycho-
logical and cultural expression that is symptomatic of the current
disconnection of the present from the past and the future. Cultural
semiotics, nevertheless, should not campaign against this practice
of self–representation but encourage awareness of its meaning and
underline the need not to neglect aesthetic practices that are oriented
toward other temporal eons. There is nothing intrinsically despicable
in taking selfies with artworks in museums, for instance, but cultural
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semiotics must warn that this tribute to the durative experience of the
present would be diminutive of the complexity of the western culture
of time if, before or after taking such selfies, the visitors of a museum
were not to indulge in aesthetic practices that, on the contrary, cater
to the symbolical needs of other temporal dimensions.
Let us continue taking selfies with Monna Lisa, but then let us
take pictures of this painting as well, and, above all, let us look at it
(Stavens ), thus engrossed in it that the mysterious smile becomes
a figurative door to all the past smiles that we irremediably lost, and
to all the future smiles that, hopefully, await us.
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